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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
The only way that such a release can free the tortfeasor from
his duty to contribute is to include a provision to the effect
that the other tortfeasors shall be released from the injured
person's pro rata share of the common liability.'
(7) Another optional section of the act enables one or
more of several tortfeasors sued by the injured person to add
as third-party defendants any fellow joint tortfeasors whom
they believe to have been also responsible for the tort. In this
way the interests of justice may be promoted by obviating the
necessity of a separate action for contribution.'
As can be easily seen, a legislative adoption of these pro-
visions of the Uniform Act would establish a system whereby
the respective liabilities of the tortfeasors could be equitably
and conveniently determined, and the distribution of loss
would be governed by the respective degrees of fault."
Robert Brooke.
IS A LANDLORD IN MONTANA ANSWERABLE IN TORT
FOR BREACH OF COVENANT TO REPAIR THE
LEASED PREMISES?
In this paper we shall deal with the question of a landlord
who contracts with his tenant to repair defects in the leased
premises and: fails to do so. Injury results to the tenant prox-
imately caused by such defect not being remedied by the land-
lord as he had agreed. Can the tenant recover in a tort action,
Sec. 5 (ann.)
'Sec. 7 (the procedural aspect of this section is modeled as closely as
possible after the new FEDERAL RULES OF CIviL PROCEDURE, 28 U. S.
C. A., following 723c.
"It might be well to note a recent criticism directed towards this mod-
ern view of the law of contribution among joint tortfeasors. Mr.
James, in 54 HARV. L. REv. 1170, advocates a program of socialization
of loss by the simple theory of retaining the common law rule against
contribution. His argument boils down to the premise that joint and
several liability among tortfeasors, without contribution, gives the in-
jured person a free hand in shifting the loss to that tortfeasor best
able to bear it thus passing it on to society in general. This argu-
ment seems inconclusive due to the fact that it appears to be predicat-
ed on the rapid increase in joint tort liability in automobile accidents
where If no contribution is allowed, the loss in the majority of cases
would be borne by an insurance company, thus effecting a wider dis-
tribution of loss. In innumerable other tort actions, this result would
not follow.
For an excellent defense of the law allowing contribution among
Joint tortfeasors, in answer to the theory broached by Mr. James, see
Mr. Gregory's reply in 54 HARV. L. REv. 1170.
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or must he be satisfied with an action on the contract and a
contract measure of damages?
At common law, a rule similar to caveat emptor applied
to leased realty. Courts looked at the transaction as a sale
of an interest in the land, title to which vested in the lessee
immediately upon the execution of the lease. He was entitled
to the exclusive and peaceable enjoyment thereof during the
term. The prospective tenant could inspect as fully as could
the landlord, and consequently he took for better or for worse.
Since the landlord was under no duty to repair defects exist-
ing prior to the lease, a fortiori, he was under no duty to re-
pair dilapidations which occurred during the tenancy, even
though called to his attention by the tenant.'
To this general rule that the landlord owes no duty to
the tenant to makle the premises safe, the courts early devel-
oped a number of exceptions.' One was that the landlord
would be liable for any concealed or hidden dangers he knew
to exist, but which the tenant could not discover. A second
was where the premises leased were to be used for a public pur-
pose, and here again the landlord was liable to members of the
public injured by defects in the premises.! The landlord was
also held liable for injuries occurring in common passages
where the landlord and not the tenant retained control. A
fourth exception was where the landlord in fact purported to
have repaired the defect but in fact aggravated it, to the ten-
ant's injury. A fifth exception involves landlords covenant to
repair and failure to do so. It is with this exception alone
that we are concerned.
At common law this exception was not recognized. If the
landlord covenanted to repair and injuries resulted from his
failure to do so, the damages recoverable for the breach were
limited to the difference between the rental value of the prem-
ises with repairs, and their rental value without. Damages re-
sulting from an injury to a tenant's person or property were
too remote to be recovered in an action on the covenant. Nor
could damages to a third party or his property be recovered
because the covenant to repair was not made for his benefit.'
Clearly recovery was limited strictly to a contract, not a tort,
measure of damages.
'Bohlen, Landlord and Tenant, 35 HABv. L. REv. 633.
Prosser on Torts (1st ed. 1941) sec. 81, p. 648.
'Junkermann v. Tilyou Realty Co. (1915) 213 N. Y. 404, 408, 108 N. E.
190, L. R. A. 1915F 700.
'Harkrider, Tort Liability of a Landlord, 26 MICH. L. REv. 260; 1
Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant p. 589.
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The majority of American jurisdictions still hold that the
tenant's action for landlord's breach of covenant to repair is
ex contractu not ex delicto. The lessor's liability for non per-
formance is said by the Maine court' to be no greater than
that of a carpenter or other person contracting to repair.
". .. if the lessor contracts to repair the premises in the
possession and under the control of his tenant, his liabil-
ity is no greater or different than would be the liability
of a third person, e.g. carpenter or other mechanic who
contracts to make such repairs.
A leading case in establishing this view was Schick v.
Fleischauer.' Here the landlord had been notified of a defec-
tive ceiling and had agreed to repair, but he failed to do so and
it fell on the tenant, causing the injuries complained of. The
court held that a mere contract by the landlord to repair did
not subject him to liability for negligence for personal injuries
resulting to the tenant from the failure to perform the con-
tract.
"Where the sole relation between two parties is con-
tractual in its nature, a breach of the contract does not
usually create a liability as for negligence."
New York hai recently reiterated this view which has
also been taken by the Michigan courts which said,
". .. The tenant cannot maintain an action of tort
for a breach of the contract duty of the owner to keep the
house in repair, there being no contract, and if there were,
tort would not lie .... The tenant's right to recover dam-
ages in tort can only be based on Pub. Acts 1917, No. 167,
#71, requiring the owner to keep the premises in repair,
which duty is ultra contractual."
A recent Pennsylvania case' in an action for trespass for
injuries to the wife of a tenant caused by the collapse of a
stairway, where judgment for defendant was affirmed, fol-
lowed this view. The court held:
... an agreement to repair does not impose on the
landlord liability in tort at the suit of the tenant or other
aJacobson et al v. Leventhal, (1930) 128 Me. 424; 148 A. 281; 68 A. L.
R. 1192.
'(1898) 26 App. Div. 210; 49 N. Y. S. 962.
'Cullings v. Goetz et al. (1931) 241 N. Y. S. 109, 111.
8Annis v. Britton (1925) 233 Mich. 291, 105 N. W. 128.
'Harris et ux. v. Lewistown Trust Co. et al. (1937) 326 Pa. 145; 191
A. 34.
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on the land in the right of the tenant, since liability in
tort should follow the legal incident of occupation and
control, and occupation and control are not reserved by
an agreement of the landlord to repair."
The court goes on to recognize that a minority of the juris-
dictions take the opposite view and hold that a promise to re-
pair is a reservation of control over the premises. The Penn-
sylvania court expresses its disagreement with the Barron
case, which appears below.
Vermont also accepts this rule in a late case" and the
court says,
it *'We accept the rule as stated by Cardozo, C.J.,
in the Cullings case that '. . . occupation and control are
not reserved through an agreement that the landlord will
repair.' "
In direct opposition to the common law view limiting re-
covery to a contract measure of damages is that of the Re-
statement of Torts shown in Sections 357' and 378.' A va-
riety of ingenious theories has been advanced in support of
this liability by courts adopting the minority view. The most
popular one is that under an agreement to repair, the lessor
retains the privilege to enter and supervise the property and
so is in "control" of the premises, and subject to the same
duties as the occupier. This seems to be the theory the Min-
nesota court proceeded under in the leading case of Barron v.
Liedloff." This was an action for damages for injury to a sub-
tenant caused by a board in the porch giving way, after the
landlord (defendant) had agreed to repair it.
it **where he agrees to repair and keep in repair the
leased premises, his right to enter and have possession of
"*Soulia v. Noyes et al. (1940) .... Vt....., 16 A. 2nd 173.
"Restatement, Torts, Sec. 357.
A lessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to his
lessee and others upon the land with the consent of the lessee or
his sub-lessee by a condition of disrepair existing before or arising
after the lessee has taken possession, if
a. the lessor, as such, has agreed by a covenant in the lease or other-
wise, to keep the land in repair, and
b. the disrepair creates an unreasonable risk to persons upon the land
which performance of lessor's agreement would have prevented.
"Restatement, Torts, Sec. 378.
A lessor of land who, as such, contracts with his lessee to keep prem-
ises in repair, is subject to liability for bodily harm to others out-
side the land caused by a condition of disrepair which involves an
unreasonable risk to them which the lessor's performafice of his
contract would have made reasonably safe.
"(1905) 95 Minn. 474, 475; 104 N. W. 289.
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the premises for that purpose is necessarily implied and
his duties and liabilities are in some respects similar to
those of owner and occupant. And if his negligence in
making or failing to make the repairs results in an unsafe
condition of the premises, he is liable for injuries caused
thereby to persons lawfully on the premises who are not
guilty of contributory negligence on their part."
This view is carried to the extreme in the case of Keiper v.
Anderson 6t al,1" where recovery was allowed in an action for
the death of plaintiff's husband, a janitor, due to tuberculosis.
The alleged cause was defendant landlord's failure to keep
premises heated, as he had covenanted to do.' But it seems
obvious that the control in such cases is a mere fiction since
the landlord has no power to exclude anyone or to direct the
use of the land.
A second theory, and it would seem a better one, is that
the lessor by his promise has induced the tenant to forego mak-
ing repairs himself, and by such misleading undertaking has
made himself responsible for the consequences that proxi-
mately result. He is distinguished from other contractors by
the peculiar probability that the tenant will rely on him. In
short, it is the doctrine of reliance. This view has been taken
by the Tennessee court." Whatever the theory, the cases seem
to represent a rather ill-defined feeling that the responsibility
which has been voluntarily retained by the landlord should
not be shifted to the tenant.
The question then arises as to the position of the Montana
court. Our legislature early adopted two sections of the Cali-
fornia code verbatim which have an important bearing on the
problem.
R. C. M. (1935) 7741 Lessor to Make Dwelling House
Fit for its Purpose.
Lessor of building intended for the occupation of
human beings, must, in the absence of an agreement to
the contrary, put it in a condition fit for such occupation,
and repair all subsequent dilapidations thereof which ren-
der it untenantable, except such as are mentioned in Sec-
tion 7734.
R. C. M. (1935) 7742 When Lessee May Make Repairs,
Etc.
14(1916) 138 Minn. 392; 165 N. W. 237; LRA 1918C 299.
"Good v. Von Henert, 114 Minn. 393; 131 N. W. 466. Ames v. Brand-
vold, (1912) 119 Minn. 521, 138 N. W. 787. Deegan v. Heilman Brew-
ery Co. (1915) 129 Minn. 496, 152 N. W. 877.
1 Merchants Cotton Press and Storage Co. v. Miller (1916) 135 Tenn.
187; 186 S. W. 87.
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If, within a reasonable time after notice to the lessor
of dilapidations which he ought to repair, he neglects to
do so, the lessee may repair the same himself where the
cost of such repairs does not require an expenditure great-
er than one month's rent of the premises, and deduct the
expense of such repairs from the rent, or lessee can va-
cate the premises jn which case he shall be discharged from
further payment of rent, or performance of other condi-
tions.1'
As there were already a number of cases decided in Cali-
fornia in reference to these sections when Montana adopted
them, it is assumed our legislature intended to adopt the con-
struction given by those cases. In one of the first of these,"
the California court held that the only statutory consequences
of a breach of lessor's obligation were that lessee could either
vacate or repair it himself. In a later case" the same court
again held that the obligation imposed by the first section
... should be and is, limited to the extent of the
privilege conferred on the tenant by section 1942 (R. C.
M. (1935) 7742) and the only consequences of the breach
of the landlord's obligation is that the tenant may either
vacate or expend a month's rent on repairs."
In the recent (1918) and more conclusive case of Granzer v.
Flanagan' the tenant brought suit for injuries caused his child
by a gas explosion. The tenant and the landlord's agent, in in-
specting the house, had noted a gas pipe uncapped. The agent
had promised to repair but had failed to do so. The court held
for the defendant, and that the statute provided the remedy,
and that the tenant could treat the landlord's failure to repair
as a breach of the lease and vacate or make repairs himself.
With these cases in mind, let us see what our court has
done. Even before the statutes in question were adopted, the
court held that the lease of a house is no implied warranty that
the property is fitted for the use for which it is let, or for any
purpose, or that it will remain in a tenantable condition.' The
court early (1904) limited the application of the sections strict-
ly to dwelling houses' and in the case of Bush, Executrix v.
Baker" decided that the tenant, after making repairs amounting
"California Civil Code, (1920) Sections 1941, 1942.
"(1888) Seeber v. Blanc, 76 Cal. 173, 18 P. 260.
"(1899) Gately v. Campbell, 124 Cal. 250; 57 P. 567.
"35 Cal. App. 724; 170 P. 1076.
2(1898) York v. Stewart et al. 21 Mont. 515; 55 P. 29.
"Landt et al v. Schneider, 31 Mont. 15; 77P. 307.
"(1915) 51 Mont. 326; 152 P. 750.
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to one month's rent, could subsequently repair dilapidations oc-
curring in a following month, even though both expenditures ex-
ceeded the amount of one month's rent. It was further held
however, that the tenant had no redress for damages to person
or property consequent on the landlord's failure to repair. In
the case of Dier v. Mueller" the lessee notified lessor that the
porch had fallen into disrepair, and he promised to remedy the
defect but failed to do so. A month later the injury complained
of resulted but the court held no right of action for personal in-
jury existed and that the demurrer was properly sustained.
Our court relied on the California case of Van Every v. Ogy "
and said,
it... whether the construction is right or not, it is pre-
sumably adopted with the sections themselves and it consti-
tutes a right of property, and the courts of this state are
without authority to alter it."
Another jurisdiction whose decisions should be very per-
suasive with our court is Oklahoma. It has statutory provi-
sions almost identical to ours.' In an action for personal in-
juries caused by gas escaping from an uncapped pipe' the
court found the demurrer properly sustained. The court
couldn't agree with plaintiff's contention that it was defend-
ant's duty to make the house "fit for human occupation" be-
fore being occupied by her. Rather it held the tenants rem-
edy confined to the statute, and beyond it she could not re-
cover damages. In other words, the obligation of the land-
lord in the one section was limited to the extent of the privi-
lege conferred on the tenant in the other section.
In a similar case for an action by the tenant for the death
of an infant son caused by falling down a cystern, the Okla-
homa court held'
*... In absence of fraud and concealment of the lessor
as to some defect known to him and unknown to the lessee,
the rule of caveat emptor applies, and the lessee takes the
premises . . . in whatever condition they may be in, thus
assuming all risk of personal injury from defects therein."
"(1917) 53 Mont. 288; 163 P. 466.
(1881) 59 Cal. 563.
"Oklahoma Compiled Statutes (1931) Sections 10926, 10927.
'Lavery v. Brigance et al. (1925) 122 Okla. 31, 242 P. 239, 93 A. L. R.
782.
"Godbey v. Barton et al (1939) 184 Okla. 237, 87 P. 2nd 261; Young v.
Beattie, (1935) 172 Okla. 250, 45 P. 2nd 470; (1937) Alfe v. N. Y.
Life Ins. Co. et al., 180 Okla. 87, 67 P. 2nd 947.
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No attempt has here been made to decide between the
majority or New York rule and the minority or Minnesota
rule, as a matter of policy and reason. The query is raised
however, whether the Montana court would be free, if the
case ever arises, to adopt the Restatement view. R. C. M.
(1935) 7741 does not precisely cover the situation of a cove-
nant to repair. If it is held to apply to that situation, would
it also limit recovery in the case of common passageways, a
dangerous concealed defect, or the other exceptions to the gen-
eral rule mentioned at the first of this article ? While this may
still be an open question, it is submitted that, even irrespective
of the more widely accepted majority view, in the light of
the California and Oklahoma cases under statutes identical or
similar to ours our court could not consistently adopt the Re-
statement view. In this state the code offers the tenant re-
lief from the harsh common law rule, and this relief is ap-
parently exclusive. If a change is desired, it would seem to
be for the legislature, not the judiciary, to bring it about.
Orville Gray.
VOLUNTARY ASSUMPTION OF DUTY; CIVIL LIABILITY
OF ADJACENT PROPERTY OWNER FOR CONDITION OF
SIDEWALK. STEWART v. STANDARD PUBLISHING CO.'
This was a case in which the plaintiff sought to recover
damages for personal injuries suffered by her in a fall on a
sidewalk adjacent to defendant's place of business as a re-
sult of the accumulation of ice and snow thereon. The side-
walk had been constructed by defendant and had been main-
tained by defendant since its construction. The sidewalk was
defective in that the stones had become uneven so that water
could collect and freeze. The ice was covered with a light fall
of snow. Defendant had been in the practice of cleaning the
sidewalk of ice and snow and employed janitors for this pur-
pose. This was ordinarily done about 7:30 in the morning,
but on the morning of the accident was not done until 10:00,
the accident occurring about 8:30 in the morning. The Mon-
tana Supreme Court, affirming the District Court, held that
plaintiff should recover because the defendant had constructed
the sidewalk, had assumed the duty of maintenance thereof,
and had undertaken the duty of removing the accumulation of
'(1936) 102 Mont. 43, 55 P. (2d) 694.
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